

Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design

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Nice Paper!

- New equilibrium concept: (FMFE)
 - Behaviorally appealing
 - Computationally tractable (closed-form solutions in some cases)
- Interesting application setting: Ad Exchanges
 - Great fit between method and application
- Very solid analysis
 - Insights on why results from a dynamic model are different from one-shot static model
 - Theoretical justification why FMFE is a good approximation of advertisers' behavior
 - Rich analysis of the publisher's strategy: reserve price, allocation of impressions, and information disclosure
- Very well written

Suggestions

- How does the intermediary (e.g., DoubleClick) in this setting play a role?
 - The paper focuses on publisher and advertisers
- To what extent the results are contingent on the assumption that all advertisers are running ad campaigns (i.e., there is a total budget constraint for each)?
 - Will the results become similar to those in static games if we relax this assumption?
- The publisher has outside options (opportunity cost) in allocating impressions to the exchange network. What about advertisers? Can we allow them to advertise elsewhere?

Suggestions

- As the number of advertisers increases, do these strategic tools such as reserve price and allocation of impressions still matter?
 - Might be useful to provide some results based on the number of advertisers
- Strengthen the discussion of the paper's contribution:
 - New equilibrium concept: where else can this concept be applied? Limitations of this concept?
 - Ad Exchanges: What are the takeaways for publishers or advertisers?